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INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR A PHILOSOPHICAL
ANTHROPOLOGY
CHARLES FRIEDt
The purpose of this article is to set out the difficulties that beset the
attempts to resolve the full range of questions raised by genetic counsel-
ing and other techniques growing out of the "new biology."- Perhaps
the rights and obligations involved in genetic counseling (as opposed
to some kind of therapy or other intervention) seem relatively straight-
forward. Some see the practice, indeed the profession, of giving advice
about genetic disorders as related to the practice of doing something
about such disorders. Today that means avoiding conception, perhaps
deciding not to marry, or preventing the birth of a fetus at risk. But
it could mean other things. It could mean state intervention to prevent
the birth of genetically defective individuals. And, through the exten-
sion of the techniques of prenatal analysis-amniocentesis-it could lead
to parental choice of the sex of the children they would allow to be born.
So here, as everywhere in this area, we are right in the middle of the
whole congeries of ethical and political problems raised by the new
biology.
In general it is my belief that very little truly illuminating or, there-
fore, useful has been written by way of solution, although much has
been produced to show the implications of the existing and potential
techniques of the new biology. What I would like to do is to indicate
the general categories of ethical questions that these possibilities raise.
These categories are frequently ignored, to the added confusion of an
often confused subject.
t Professor of Law, Harvard University School of Law.
1. This paper was originally presented at the Symposium sponsored by the John
E. Fogarty International Center for Advanced Study in the Health Sciences and the
Institute of Society, Ethics and Life Sciences, at Warrenton, Virginia, October, 1971.
The paper was delivered in response to a presentation by Lord Charles Kilbrandon.
Both papers are reprinted in ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMANT GENEriCs: GENETIC COUNSE-
ING AND THE Usa OF GENETIC KNOWLEDGE (B. Berkeley, D. Callahan, T. Condliffe,
M. Harris & B. Hilton eds. 1973).
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DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
The definition of distributive justice given by Aristotle is one I
have in mind for this first category. Distributive justice relates to the
distribution of undoubted goods in circumstances of scarcity. Thus (1)
what constitutes a value is not in dispute. All would choose the goods
involved. And (2) the problem therefore arises out of the scarcity,
because there is not enough to go around. Thus the issues are easier,
because we do not have to worry in this instance about what our defini-
tion of values is, only how we distribute them.
Applied to the area of our concern, the problem is who is to benefit
from scarce medical resources. This is hardly a new question. It obtains
as well in respect to housing, education, or money in general. One
special feature is the immediacy and sharpness of some of the distri-
butive choices. Who gets access to an artificial kidney or who gets the
organ transplant determines directly and immediately who shall live
or die. Whether the choice should be made in terms of deserts-the
worthier person or need-or on some random and thus equal basis,
poses the traditional dilemma of distributive justice. And, of course,
to pass the buck to boards of clergymen, citizens or whoever, is not to
resolve the issue, only to leave it to others to resolve. More about this
institutionalized evasion of intellectual responsibility will be discussed
later.
At a more remote and probably more practical level are questions
relating to the allocation of resources between the fancy techniques of
modem medicine and the new biology and humbler measures like vac-
cination, improved diets and the like. Who are the beneficiaries of each
kind of expenditure? Are we not perhaps fooling ourselves when we
say that future generations in large numbers will benefit by today's
exotic research? Is it not more the case that some things are of greater
interest to the scientist? Or worse still, is it not possible that those who
make the distributional decision know that the humbler measures of
public health will not benefit them, while they and their loved ones
will be the beneficiaries of wonder cures?
On this question we need not only understand what our distribu-
tional norm is, but we also need to work out who, in fact, the benefici-
aries of alternative choices may be. Vague references to the welfare of
future generations certainly are not enough. Applied to genetic counsel-
ing, for instance, we need to know who the beneficiaries of the services
provided are, what good is done, and what the alternative uses of
resources might be-for instance, improved family planning information
generally.
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THE PROBLEM OF RIGHTS
The problem of rights-rights of individuals against each other,
against the collectivity, even against the public good-is a modem
problem. The modern liberal or individualistic concept of personality
presupposes a concept of rights which the individual can claim against
the socially defined good. This concept of right is heavily involved
in the issues which concern us here. Even as to the special question of
genetic counseling, we ask whether a person has the right to certain
kinds of information, such as the right to have his case treated con-
fidentially, the right to an abortion, or, conversely, the right to marry
and have children. From a different angle, we ask whether there is a
right to be born, once conceived. In other areas of the new biology,
there has been talk of the right to die, the right to be genetically unique,
and the right to be the product of normal sexual intercourse and
pregnancy.
Two things are striking about such assertions of right. First,
rights are usually asserted, so it follows that their possessor can waive
their assertion. This is a corollary of the concept of rights as belonging
to the individual. Second, if they are worth anything, the rights must
be assertable as against the claims of the collectivity. And this is how
they are characteristically used. The right to marry and have children
need only be asserted if society is claiming that the common good, for
eugenic reasons, requires that certain persons not reproduce. The right
to confidentiality is asserted in the face of a public need to know. And
the mother's right to an abortion is asserted against the unborn child's
right to live. This last claim of right must be made on behalf of the
unborn child, and for that reason some have thought it an invalid
claim. It is made as well against the possible claim of the public good
that unwanted children represent a public liability.
What we are far from having is a comprehensive theory of rights,
much less a unified theory which shows how rights and the notion of
the public good are functions of some over-all scheme. It is, however,
a subject that is occupying the thought of some of the best modem
philosophers. And, although there are no breakthroughs in philosophy
in the same sense as there are in science, we can expect increasing under-
standing.
THE FRANKENSTEIN PROBLEM
The issues which the new biology has raised more strikingly than
any others have not been the foregoing, since they have always been
clearly present in much that we do as individuals and as a society. The
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striking problem is that raised by our growing capacity to affect who
we will become, to affect what the nature of man will be. Both dis-
tributive justice and the question of rights proceed from the assumption
that we know what we want, and the question is which of our values
will be realized. But eugenics, whether as a result of genetic counseling
or of more arcane methods, as well as chemical and electrical interven-
tion with mental processes, may allow us to determine what wants we
or our children will have.
These capacities raise different questions. If we can ensure that
we or some future person will have certain values, a particular constella-
tion of appetites and preferences, how shall we choose? We are cut
adrift completely from the notion that we must try to realize the desires
of existing and future beings. We must decide instead what those
desires should be.
This requires a deeper conception of value, of the good. Education
is the social process most nearly akin to the Frankensteinian possibilties
of the new biology. But even there we have always been able to finesse
-if we wished-the deep problems, by assuming an innate human nature
whose potentialities education was designed to bring to realization. Here
we can manipulate human nature itself. But for that we need unavoid-
ably a normative concept of human nature. And, of course, to change
nothing is to assume that the status quo is itself normative-an implausi-
ble suggestion in light of the evidence of anthropology that man's intel-
ligence, capacities and temperament have themselves been subject to
evolutionary forces throughout the millenia.
THE RESPONSES
What I have seen of the attempts to deal with these problems has
been only occasionally encouraging. Perhaps the patent need to arrive
at what I shall call a philosophical anthropology, i.e., a normative
concept of human nature, has naturally suggested the intervention of
theologians. Professor Paul Ramsey of Princeton has certainly grasped
this kind of problem,2 although I must confess I have failed to grasp
the structure of his analyses and solutions.
The dominant current of secular Anglo-American ethical philosophy
is, I believe, a mixture of utilitarianism and Kantian humanism. Both
of these provide only limited help in solving the Frankenstein problem.
The deeper philosophy, that derived from Kant, places a primary
emphasis on respect for man's rationality and autonomy. This rational
2. P. RAMSEY, FABRICATED MAN (1970).
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freedom, freedom even from determination by one's own psychological
drives, is for Kant the defining feature of man's nature. Clearly this
is a normative concept of human nature.
Unfortunately, the applicability of the Kantian ethic to these issues
is problematic. Since morals are autonomous from man's contingent
nature-his psychological makeup-it would seem that the content of
that contingent nature is of no interest to moral philosophy. Perhaps,
however, if we could get a better understanding than we now have-or
than that which Kant gives us--of freedom of choice and its precondi-
tions, we might discover what developments of the person are most
conducive to moral freedom.
The distinguished French biochemist, Jacques Monod, has taken
what seems to me to be the other leg on which Kantian ethics stand-
rationality-and fashioned from it a criterion for value. In this "Ethique
de la Connaissance," he proposes as distinctly human whatever en-
chances man's capacity to understand, truly and objectively, the struc-
ture of the universe.' My difficulty with this standard is that it is
incomplete. It gives no way of evaluating the relations persons may have
to each other or the kinds of feelings they might have, except as these
affect their capacity to obtain scientific knowledge.
Clearly the development of intellectually satisfactory and satisfying
value criteria for the development of man's future is a remote and
arduous task. It may involve the development of related epistemological
and metaphysical structures. All this is a daunting prospect: no im-
mediate results, no resolutions approved by international congresses.
Partly out of the anti-intellectualism of modern science and scientists-
many of whom are both unconcerned with and impatient of the great
philosophical traditions-and partly out of an impatient desire to attain
some results, to reach some conclusions, there has grown up what I
would call a cult of second-orderism. Rather than try to develop systems
of thought about these questions of value, thought is channeled into the
fashioning of institutions in which these value choices would be made.
In the corrupt version of this, which I shall call conferencism, groups
of distinguished persons state their strongly held views, and then the
effort is expended in maneuvering for a group consensus. Of course,
reasons for the strongly held views are only sketchily presented, if at all,
and the task of dissecting the reasoning behind and the evidence for the
views is quite out of order.
A more valid version of second-orderism is the design of institutional
3. J. MONOD, LE HASA"D ET LA NECESSITE 191-95 (1970).
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structures such that wide sectors of the public might be involved in the
decisions that affect their future and that of coming generations. I
say this is more valid because there are well-established norms that af-
-firm the value of wide public involvement in the future of the common-
weal. But this only takes us part of the way. Although the power of
decision should be widely shared, this says nothing at all about the
validity of the decision reached. It is a mindless fallacy to pass from
the proposition that the majority should rule to the proposition that what
the majority rules is right. We still have the responsibility, as responsi-
ble men of intellect, to conclude what we think is right on the merits,
and to try to persuade our fellow citizens in the appropriate councils.
Thus, as in the example of genetic counseling, what the rights and
obligations are to be should in the end be established by democratic
institutions, but surely those institutions must be informed by the under-
standing of specialists. The development of that understanding, however,
is a task for arduous, patient effort, and it is no more easily or casually
attained than are the scientific discoveries which opened up these issues.
